In May 1924, the Hindu proprietor of a bookstore in Lahore by the name of Mahashe Rajpal printed a purportedly “scurrilous pamphlet” titled Rangila Rasul. The author of the pamphlet remained anonymous, although researchers have since determined that the author was an Arya Samajist by the name of Pandit Chamupati. The publication quickly aggravated communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims within the region, with the first edition selling one thousand copies. Within a couple of months, protests and agitation by a particular community had alerted the Punjab government to its existence. Officials such as Governor Hailey of Punjab recognised the severity of the offence contained within the text of the pamphlet.
The level of unrest prompted the government to charge Rajpal under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code. The trial proceedings, prosecuting Rajpal under this section, commenced in October before the magistrate, but the final judgment of the Lahore High Court was not issued for three years. The writing in the pamphlet matched the salacious insinuations of its title, as it brazenly discussed the intimate relationships of the Prophet Muhammad.
During the trial, the defence argued that the “allegations in the pamphlet were true, as shown by the fact that they were based upon material in works by Muslim and European scholars.” The Magistrate found that Rajpal was guilty, but held that factual truthfulness would be relevant. The prosecution challenged the said finding. On November 13, 1925, Justice Martineau of the Lahore High Court, in a short judgment in Crown v. Raj Pal, 1925 SCC OnLine Lah 312 found that “it is relevant to show the intention of the accused in writing the pamphlet complained of, and also to prove that the allegations contained therein are based on facts as distinguished from rumour.”
Subsequently, the Magistrate determined that Rajpal’s publication had been “a wanton attack upon the Prophet of Islam to hold him up to ridicule and contempt, to ridicule his religion and thus to wound the feelings of his followers,” and that he was guilty under Section 153-A because “the natural result of the publication of such a pamphlet would be to incense the Muhammadans against the author of the book and those whom they conceive to be, rightly or wrongly, as the sympathizers of the author.”
Factoring in the lack of “mitigating factors” and acknowledging that “communal relations…were already tense” the Magistrate, issued a rather severe sentence of eighteen months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000. On appeal before the Lahore Sessions Court, the judge, F Nicholas, upheld the Magistrate’s original judgment, but reduced Rajpal’s sentence to six months of rigorous imprisonment.
In appeal to the Lahore High Court, on May 4, 1927, Justice Dalip Singh in Raj Paul v. Emperor, [1927 SCC OnLine Lah 304: AIR 1927 Lah 590] delivered the final, landmark ruling in the Rajpal case, and one that would prove to have long-lasting consequences on criminal law related to religious offences within India.
The petitioner argued that the facts of the Rangila Rasul case “[did] not constitute an offence within the meaning of S. 153A,” on the grounds that “the word ‘classes’ does not include religious denominations but means ‘races,’” and that “criticism or satire on a religious teacher is not within the purview of the section.” Justice Dalip Singh, quoting the previous decisions of the judges from the lower courts, noted that the trial court found that the accused had no other intention except to make a wanton attack upon the Prophet of Islam, to hold him up to ridicule and contempt, to ridicule his religion and thus, to wound the feelings of his followers.
Justice Dalip Singh rejected the defence’s contentions that “the pamphlet [did] not show any such intention and that it was only meant to show the evils of polygamy and marriage between persons of disparate age” and concurred with each of the lower court judges’ respective positions that the pamphlet was in fact a “scurrilous satire on the founder of the Muslim religion,” but not an attack upon the religion as a whole.
Following this, the judge described another argument put forward by the government advocate who at that time effectively argued that there should be a different standard adopted for free speech depending upon the tolerance levels and the “fanatical” nature of the followers.
However, the judge immediately rejected this argument on the grounds that “ignorance or fanaticism of a particular community” should not “determine the nature of an act.” Although he acknowledged that such attitudes might “aggravate the offence in certain cases,” he viewed the consequence of this line of argument as unacceptable, stating that “The nature of the act, namely whether it is an offence or not, cannot be determined by the reaction of a particular class.” The said finding is critical, and in terms of the principle of rule of law and equal application of laws, a finding which would often be ignored in the future.
Finally, on the question of the applicability of Section 153A and on how the provision is to function in such difficult situations, the judge held that the
“section was intended to prevent persons from making attacks on a particular community as it exists at the present time and was not meant to stop polemics against deceased religious leaders however scurrilous and in bad taste such attacks might be.”
Justice Dalip Singh acquitted the accused and held that the pamphlet may arise “contempt of all decent persons” and may even “wound the religious feelings of certain Mussalmans”, but cannot be held to have promoted feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes.
This distinction between distasteful content, which may even invite contempt by a class or community, as opposed to content promoting enmity or hatred, was a fine legal distinction carved out by Justice Singh. This fine distinction in application evidently results in protecting free speech. This distinction, propounded in the pre-constitutional era, has often been ironically blurred in the era of freedom of expression had constitutional protection.
Be that as it may, what followed was even more startling. After several unsuccessful assassination attempts on Rajpal, he was stabbed to death by a young carpenter named Ilm-ud-din on April 6, 1929. Ilm-ud-din was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out on October 31, 1929. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, in Ilam Din v. Emperor [1929 SCC OnLine Lah 379 : AIR 1930 Lah 157] records that Ilm-ud-din was represented by none other than Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a leading lawyer in Bombay at the time.
It is said that the eulogy at the funeral of Ilm-uddin was read by none other than Allama Iqbal [of Saare Jahan Se Aacha fame]. An interesting fact is that Rajpal was merely the publisher of the pamphlet, and was not the actual the writer of the contentious publication. However, despite constant death threats, he never revealed the actual writer, and paid the highest price for these heroics.
Source: Barandbench
