In a case involving Vikash Metal & Power Ltd, the trial court had acknowledged that the role of other Ministries in the allocation process could not be said to be above board. It noted that various acts of omission and commission could possibly be attributed even to the Coal Ministry’s Under Secretary, who was the prosecution’s star witness. Yet, the court proceeded on what it termed as a ‘deficient investigation’ and ‘self-contradictory deposition of prosecution witnesses’ to build its case against the officials. The logic given in another case was that since they were ‘senior and well experienced IAS officers’, the procedural lapses could not be on account of their inefficiency or incapability. The officers’ experience, therefore, became a ground for ascribing criminal intentions to them.
As per the CAG’s 2012 report, Coal Ministry’s officials had in fact been pushing for a switch from the Screening Committee’s allocations to competitive auctions since 2004. But the politics of the process, which included fears of dilution of control by the Ministries and states, delayed this amendment till 2010.
It is ironic that the persons now facing corruption charges were actively involved in shaping this reform. They also attempted incremental improvements in the allocation process, for instance, by issuing a public advertisement for the administrative allocations, which was done for the first time in 2005. This led to a doubling of the number of applications. But, as the record shows, the Ministry did not have the capacity or processes to handle this.
Source: Barandbench
