The Court noted that after the order was passed without hearing, it was not even communicated to Naik, and was only communicated to the complainant, his lawyers and the State Bar Council.
“The impugned order which has grave civil consequence on the petitioner is passed at the outset, without hearing him and even communicating it to him. The petitioner comes to know of it when the order reaches the State Bar Council,” it recorded.
Further, it held that the submission with respect to the order being only an interim order was flawed, as even an interim order could cause prejudice.
“The submission that the order is only an interim order, it would not become an order that is depicted in sub-section (2) of Section 48A, is noted only to be rejected, as it is fundamentally flawed. Order, would mean, each and every order that would prejudicially affect any person. The prejudice caused in the case at hand is, taking away the livelihood of the petitioner as he is barred from practicing in any Court of law. Therefore, an order as observed in subsection (2) of Section 48A would mean any order either interim or final which would prejudicially affect the person,” it stated.
Therefore, the Court quashed the BCI’s order and remitted the matter so that Naik could be heard before orders were passed against him in accordance with law.
Source: Barandbench
